In this article
- Breaches are mostly boring
- The five common routes in
- What happens to the data afterwards
- What a breach notice actually means for you
- Why the same advice keeps appearing
- A reasonable personal response
Breaches are mostly boring
The public picture of a data breach involves sophisticated intrusion. The reality is that the overwhelming majority arrive through a small number of unremarkable routes, and understanding which ones explains why the standard advice is what it is.
The five common routes in
1. A stolen or reused password
An employee reuses a password that leaked from an unrelated site years earlier. An automated tool tries the pair against corporate systems and one of them works. No malware, no exploit, no skill required. This is the single most common starting point, and it is why unique passwords and two-factor authentication matter more than any security product.
2. A phished login
A convincing copy of a login page captures a username, a password, and — through real-time relaying — a one-time code. The attacker is inside within the code's 30-second window. Passkeys defeat this because they will not respond to a domain that is not the real one.
3. An unpatched internet-facing system
A remote access service, a firewall, a file transfer appliance or a web application with a known flaw that was fixed months earlier. Automated scanning finds these continuously, at internet scale, without any interest in who owns them.
4. A third party
The breached organisation is often not the one you have a relationship with. Payroll providers, marketing platforms, customer service tools, analytics vendors and file transfer services all hold other companies' data, which makes them efficient targets. This is why you sometimes receive a notice from a company you have never heard of.
5. Misconfiguration
A storage bucket left publicly readable, a database exposed without a password, a backup on an open server. No attack is required at all; the data was simply reachable.
What happens to the data afterwards
Stolen records follow a fairly consistent path. They are first used by whoever took them, then sold to others, then eventually circulated freely as their commercial value decays. Password hashes are cracked in bulk where the original storage was weak — old systems using fast, unsalted algorithms can have most of their passwords recovered quickly, while modern slow hashing with proper salting resists this far better.
Records from different breaches are then combined. An email address from one leak, a home address from another and a date of birth from a third produce a profile far more useful than any single source. This aggregation is why old breaches still matter years later, and why a leak that seemed harmless in isolation can contribute to identity theft long afterwards.
What a breach notice actually means for you
Read what was exposed, because the right response differs.
- Email address only: expect more targeted phishing referencing that service. Low direct risk.
- Email and password: change that password immediately, and anywhere else you used it. This is the case that causes real harm.
- Security question answers: change them, and treat them as passwords in future rather than answering honestly.
- Date of birth, address, phone number: permanent exposure you cannot undo. Be aware these will be used to make future approaches convincing.
- Identity documents: consider a credit freeze or fraud alert, and monitor for accounts opened in your name.
- Payment card details: contact your bank and have the card replaced.
One warning: emails claiming "your password was found in a breach, click here" are themselves one of the most common phishing hooks. Go to the service directly rather than clicking, and check with an independent breach-lookup service instead.
Why the same advice keeps appearing
Look back at the five routes. Unique passwords defeat route one. Passkeys or an authenticator app blunt route two. Automatic updates close route three. Routes four and five are outside your control entirely — which is exactly why limiting the blast radius matters more than trying to prevent breaches you cannot influence.
That is the whole logic of the standard advice. It is not a checklist for its own sake; each item maps to a specific, commonly used route.
A reasonable personal response
- Use a password manager so every account has a different password. Our guide sets out a realistic plan.
- Turn on two-factor authentication, starting with your email account.
- Check your addresses against known breaches, and act on what you find.
- Delete accounts you no longer use rather than abandoning them.
- Keep the sensitive documents out of your inbox — most mailboxes are an accidental archive of exactly what an attacker wants.
Three examples
A supplier flaw reaches a central bank: the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (January 2021)
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was one of many organisations hit through the Accellion File Transfer Appliance (FTA), a file-transfer product that TechTarget described as roughly 20 years old and due to be retired by its vendor. That is route four above: the way in was a supplier's product.
Attackers began exploiting a previously unknown flaw (a “zero-day”) in the FTA in mid-December 2020. A report by the security firm FireEye, commissioned by Accellion, put the first exploitation at 16 December 2020. Accellion issued fixes in early January 2021. According to KPMG's later review, Accellion's email system failed to send its update notifications, so the bank was not told until 6 January 2021. It applied the updates on January 7, within 24 hours of the notice. On 10 January 2021, RBNZ disclosed the breach, and Governor Adrian Orr said he “personally owns” responsibility for it. In February 2021 RBNZ said personal information had been stolen, including dates of birth, credit details and personal email addresses. It did not say who was affected. RBNZ said its day-to-day operations, including market operations and cash and payment systems, were not affected.
It was not only the central bank. Reports named victims across government, finance, health, law, energy and retail, including the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Transport for New South Wales, Bombardier, Kroger, and the law firms Jones Day and Goodwin. Security firm Mandiant tracked the group behind the attacks as UNC2546, which it linked to the Clop ransomware group. Some stolen data later appeared on the group's leak website, and several victims received extortion emails. The same pattern, one supplier flaw and many victims, was repeated in the 2023 MOVEit mass hack, which we cover in our round-up of the biggest scams and hacks.
What the independent review found. The bank commissioned KPMG to review its response. The findings, as reported, were not just about the supplier:
- The system was used for more than it was meant for. It was supposed to be for secure file transfers, but was also used as an information store and for collaboration, against the bank's own 2014 acceptable-use guidelines. KPMG said following the rules would have significantly reduced the information at risk.
- Warnings were missed. Default alerts for possible malicious activity had been active since 2015, and alerts appeared in December 2020, but they were not followed up.
- No formal risk check. The system had never been through a certification and accreditation process, which might have identified the risks of how it was being used.
- The supplier did not say it was already being exploited. KPMG found no evidence that Accellion told the bank the flaw was being actively exploited against other customers.
- Over-reliance on the supplier. Governor Orr said the bank had relied too much on Accellion for vulnerability warnings, accepted the findings, and said the bank “takes full responsibility” for its shortfalls. He apologised to those affected.
KPMG's recommendations included more frequent incident drills, stronger security training and monitoring, a formal security strategy, updated rules for critical applications, clear communication with suppliers, a data classification standard and a framework for managing third-party risk.
Lessons for any organisation.
- Know what suppliers hold. Keep a list of the services that touch your data, and what each one stores.
- Limit what goes in. A file-transfer tool should transfer files, not become a permanent store. The less data a system holds, the less there is to lose.
- Delete data you no longer need. Old files that were never cleared out were part of the exposure in this case.
- Do not rely on the supplier to warn you. Check security bulletins yourself, and have a clear way for suppliers to reach a real person.
- Act on alerts. A warning that nobody reads is worse than no warning, because it feels like protection.
- Retire old products. Legacy software that is no longer supported is a standing risk.
- Practise for a bad day. Know in advance who decides, who calls whom and what gets switched off.
- Ask suppliers hard questions about their security, patching and how and when they will tell you about a problem.
Sources: interest.co.nz: KPMG report on the RBNZ cyber attack; BankInfoSecurity: NZ Reserve Bank governor says he “owns” breach; TechTarget: Accellion FTA attacks claim more victims (all accessed 13 October 2026).
A third party holding other companies' data: IDScan (September 2026)
IDScan.net verifies people's identity documents for other businesses, such as car rental companies. When it was breached, the exposed data belonged to its customers' customers, people who may never have heard of IDScan. That is route four above. A dark web listing claimed scans of more than 153 million licences, a number IDScan has not confirmed. Source: Help Net Security, 11 September 2026.
A powerful stolen account: Stryker (March 2026)
BleepingComputer, citing a source, reported that attackers compromised an administrator account at the medical technology company Stryker and then created a new top-level admin account, which let them wipe a very large number of work devices. This shows why a single high-privilege account needs the strongest protection. Source: Security Affairs, 17 March 2026.
Use a password manager and two-factor sign-in on your most important account first, which is your email. For the story of how a stolen supplier computer led to a record crypto theft, see crypto hacks explained. For more news, visit Cyber News.
Frequently asked questions
What is the most common cause of a data breach?
A stolen or reused password. An automated tool tries credential pairs leaked from unrelated sites, and eventually one works. No exploit or technical skill is involved.
Why did I get a breach notice from a company I have never used?
Because many breaches happen at third parties — payroll, marketing, support or file transfer providers — that hold data on behalf of companies you do use.
Does a breach mean my password was definitely exposed?
Not always. Read what the notice says was taken. Passwords are usually stored scrambled, and how recoverable they are depends on how the company stored them. Change it anyway if you reused it.
Why do old breaches still matter?
Records from different leaks are combined into profiles. An address from one and a date of birth from another make future fraud attempts far more convincing, long after the original incident.
What is a zero-day?
A security flaw that is unknown to the maker, or has no fix yet, when attackers begin using it. Defenders have had zero days to prepare.
How do I find out if my data was in a breach?
Use our password breach checker, and watch for notices from companies you use. Treat any message about a breach with care and go to the company’s official site yourself.