The quick version
- Turn on two-factor authentication on every business account, email first.
- Write a rule: any change of bank details is checked by phone, on a number you already had.
- Set up backups, then test that you can restore a file.
- Turn on automatic updates and roll out a password manager.
- Write a one-page incident plan and keep a printed copy.
In this guide
- What actually happens to small businesses
- Do these five things first
- Then these
- What business email compromise is
- The most common versions
- How the criminals do it
- Warning signs
- The call-back habit that stops it
- An illustrative example
- If you have paid the wrong account
- Training that works
- Have a plan before you need one
- A realistic order of work
What actually happens to small businesses
Small businesses are not usually targeted by name. They are caught by automated attacks that scan for whatever is reachable and weak, and by fraud that works equally well on a company of five or five thousand. That means the defences worth having are unglamorous and mostly free.
Three things cause the large majority of real losses:
- Invoice fraud. Someone gets into an email account — often a supplier's rather than yours — reads the conversation, and sends a genuine-looking message changing the bank details on an invoice. No malware, no suspicious link, nothing for a filter to catch.
- Account takeover. A reused or phished password gets someone into a mailbox, a cloud drive, or an accounting system.
- Ransomware. Files encrypted, business stopped, payment demanded. Usually arriving through a phished login or an unpatched remote access service.
Notice that none of these is a sophisticated technical attack. They are all, at root, someone getting a password or someone believing an email.
Do these five things first
1. Two-factor authentication on every business account
Email first, then accounting, banking, cloud storage, and your domain registrar. This is free, takes an afternoon across a small team, and prevents the single most common cause of loss. If you do nothing else on this page, do this.
Use an authenticator app or passkeys rather than text messages where the option exists. Keep the backup codes somewhere the business can reach if a staff member loses a phone or leaves.
2. A payment verification rule, written down
Confirm every change of bank details by phone on a number you already had, and have a second person approve larger payments. The full steps are in “The call-back habit that stops it”, further down this page.
3. Backups that are actually tested
Keep three copies of anything you cannot lose, on two different kinds of storage, with one of them offline or in a form that cannot be altered. Ransomware specifically seeks out connected backups, so a drive permanently plugged into the same machine is not a backup.
Then test a restore. A backup nobody has ever restored from is a hope, not a plan. Do it once now and once a year afterwards, and note how long it actually takes — that number is your real recovery time.
4. Updates on automatic
Operating systems, browsers, phones, and anything exposed to the internet — routers, firewalls, remote access, and any website software you run. Most successful intrusions use flaws that were fixed months earlier. Turn on automatic updates and stop thinking about it.
5. A password manager for the team
Business plans are inexpensive and solve several problems at once: no shared passwords in spreadsheets or chat, unique credentials everywhere, and — importantly — the ability to revoke access instantly when someone leaves. That last point alone justifies it.
Then these
- Separate administrator accounts from daily-use accounts. Nobody should browse the web and read email while logged in as an administrator.
- Remove access promptly when people leave. Keep a short list of every system a staff member can reach, so offboarding is a checklist rather than a memory exercise.
- Limit who can move money, and keep that list as short as the business allows.
- Turn on login alerts for email and financial systems.
- Check your email domain's anti-spoofing records — the standards that stop others sending mail that appears to come from your domain. Your web or email provider can usually do this quickly, and it protects your customers as much as you.
- Encrypt laptops and phones with full-disk encryption, which is built in and free on current systems. A lost laptop then becomes an inconvenience rather than a data breach.
- Know your obligations. Most countries require notification if personal data is exposed. Find out what applies to you before you need to know.
- Practise once. Send staff a harmless fake bank-change request, and see who phones to check.
What business email compromise is
Business email compromise (BEC) is a scam in which a criminal uses email to impersonate someone you trust, such as a supplier, your boss, a client, a lawyer or a property agent, and tricks you into sending money or sensitive information. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) counts it as one of the costliest types of cybercrime, because the payments are large and the criminal needs no malware at all.
In its 2024 report, IC3 recorded 859,532 complaints across all cybercrime types and about US$16.6 billion in reported losses overall. Business email compromise accounted for about US$2.77 billion of that, according to coverage of the report by CyberScoop and CertifID. These numbers cover only what people reported, so the real total is higher.
The name is misleading. It affects individuals as well as businesses. Home buyers, tenants, charities, schools and families are targeted in the same way.
The most common versions
- Fake invoice. An email arrives with an invoice that looks like it came from a real supplier, with a bank account that belongs to the criminal.
- Change of bank details. A message that appears to come from a supplier or landlord says: “Our bank has changed, please pay the new account from now on.” The next genuine payment goes to the criminal.
- The “boss” request. A message that seems to come from a director or manager says: “I am in a meeting. Can you buy gift cards, or make a quick payment? Keep it between us.”
- Property and legal payments. Criminals who have read a real exchange between a buyer and a conveyancer or agent send fake transfer details just before settlement, when a large amount is about to move.
- Payroll diversion. “I have a new bank, please update my pay details.” The email looks like it is from an employee.
- Account takeover. The email is real. It comes from a genuine, hacked account, so the sender’s address is correct and the thread is real. This is the hardest to spot.
How the criminals do it
There are two broad methods, and the second is more dangerous.
- Spoofing or lookalikes. They register a web address very close to a real one (for example, one letter swapped, or “-pay” added) or fake the sender’s display name. The message looks right at a glance. Our link safety checker flags lookalike names.
- Breaking into a real mailbox. Using a stolen password from a phishing email or a data breach, they log in to someone’s email. They read for days or weeks, learn who pays whom and when, and then insert themselves into a real conversation at the right moment. Often they set a hidden rule to forward or hide replies. See our guide to securing your email for the settings to check.
In both cases the aim is the same: to make a change to where the money goes, at a moment when you are busy and the request looks like routine.
Warning signs
- A change in bank details, especially one that is sudden, urgent or secret.
- Pressure to pay today, or to avoid phoning “because I am travelling”.
- The sender’s address or domain is slightly different, or the reply-to address is not the one you expected.
- Unusual tone or wording, odd grammar or a request that does not match how this person normally writes.
- A request to use gift cards, cryptocurrency or a personal account.
- New bank details that belong to a different name, a different bank or a different country from the supplier.
The call-back habit that stops it
One habit beats nearly all of these scams: confirm any change of payment details by phone, using a number you already had before the email arrived. Not the number in the email. Not a number on the new invoice.
- Pause. Treat any request to change bank details as a security event, not routine admin.
- Verify through a separate channel. Phone the supplier or colleague on a number from your own records, a previous genuine invoice or the company’s official website.
- Confirm the details out loud. Read the new account details to them and ask them to confirm.
- Use two people. For new payees or large payments, require a second person to check and approve.
- Make a test payment first if the amount is large and the account is new, and confirm that the right person received it.
- Never rely on the email thread. If the account may be hacked, the thread cannot be trusted.
This single rule prevents most invoice fraud. It costs nothing, and it works precisely because it does not depend on anyone spotting a convincing fake. Write it down, tell every person who can make a payment, and make clear that following it is never something they will be criticised for, even when it turns out to be a real supplier.
For families buying a home or paying a builder, the same rule applies: ask the professional for the bank details in person or by phone at the start, and be suspicious of any later “update”. CertifID, a company that sells fraud protection for property payments, advises not relying on unencrypted email for wiring instructions and verifying bank details yourself.
An illustrative example
This is a made-up scenario to show how smoothly the trick can run. It is not a real case.
A small building firm is paying a supplier for materials. The accounts person, Sam, has paid this supplier several times. A criminal has been reading the supplier’s hacked email for two weeks, and has seen the invoices go back and forth. On the day the next invoice is due, a message arrives in the same email thread: “Hi Sam, we have changed banks. Please use the new details on the attached invoice for this payment. Thanks.” The sender’s address is the real one, because the account has been taken over. The invoice looks the same, with a different account number.
Sam is busy and the request looks routine, so he updates the payee and pays. The supplier chases the payment a week later, and the money is already gone. Nothing was hacked at Sam’s end. A single call to the supplier’s known number before changing the payee would have exposed it in two minutes.
If you have paid the wrong account
Speed matters more than anything else. CertifID says victims often have around a day to freeze funds and that the window may be shrinking. That figure is from a company in the business, not an official number, but it matches the common advice from banks: call immediately.
- Call your bank at once. Use the number on your card or the bank’s website. Ask the fraud team to recall the payment and contact the receiving bank.
- Keep everything. Emails (with full headers if you can), invoices, screenshots and payment receipts.
- Report it. In the US, report to IC3 (ic3.gov). Elsewhere, use your national cybercrime or fraud agency; our Report a Scam page lists them.
- Secure your email and your supplier’s. Change the password, turn on two-factor authentication, check for forwarding rules, and tell the real supplier or colleague that their account may be compromised.
- Warn other contacts. The criminal may be sending the same trick to everyone in the mailbox.
- A request to change bank details is a request to move your money. Verify it by phone every time.
- Two people, one phone call and a pause for ten minutes would have stopped most of these payments.
Training that works
Annual compliance slideshows achieve very little. What works is short, specific and repeated. Fifteen minutes every couple of months on one real thing — a phishing email that actually reached your team, a supplier fraud attempt, a new scam in your industry — sticks far better than an hour once a year.
The most important cultural point is this: staff must never be punished for reporting a mistake. The expensive scenario is not someone clicking a link. It is someone clicking a link and saying nothing for three days because they are afraid. Make reporting fast, blameless, and visibly appreciated.
Have a plan before you need one
Write one page and keep a printed copy, because the digital one may be encrypted when you need it. It should answer:
- Who is called first, with mobile numbers.
- Which systems must come back first for the business to function.
- Who talks to customers, and roughly what they say.
- Your bank's fraud line, your insurer, and your IT support.
- Where the backups are and who knows how to restore them.
- Who reports to the regulator or the national cyber agency, and by when.
Half an hour producing this page is worth more than any product you could buy, because the failure mode in a real incident is confusion rather than a lack of tools.
A realistic order of work
Week one: two-factor authentication everywhere, and the written payment verification rule. Week two: backups configured and a restore tested. Week three: updates set to automatic, password manager rolled out. Week four: the one-page incident plan, and the offboarding checklist.
That is a month of modest effort with no meaningful spend, and it removes most of the realistic risk to a business of this size. Anything beyond it is refinement.
Sources
- CyberScoop: FBI IC3 2024 cybercrime report, key statistics and trendsAccessed 12 October 2026
- CertifID: Breaking down the 2024 FBI IC3 Cybercrime ReportAccessed 12 October 2026
We check every claim against the sources above and say clearly when something is advice rather than fact. This guide is general information, not legal or financial advice. Dollar amounts are in US dollars, as reported.
Frequently asked questions
Do we need cyber insurance?
It can help with the cost of recovery and legal obligations, and most insurers now expect basic controls like two-factor authentication and tested backups before they will pay. Read what the policy requires of you before relying on it.
How can I tell if an email account has been hacked?
Look for forwarding rules you did not create, replies you did not send, unfamiliar sign-ins and password reset messages you did not request. Our email security guide lists the settings to check.